A Failure of Translation
For many months, from the grisly murders on 12 June 1994 to the 'not guilty' verdict on 2 October 1995, Simpson's fate was thought to hinge on 'DNA fingerprinting' (more formally known as 'DNA typing'), a supposedly unerring method of identifying people on the basis of unique patterns in their genetic material.5 Barely contested when it was first introduced into American courts, DNA evidence became increasingly controversial following People v. Castro,6 a 1989 decision by a New York trial court which ruled that the test's reliability had not as yet been adequately established. That decision sent both scientific and law-enforcement institutions scrambling to close down any further questions about this invaluable forensic technique, and to ensure its unproblematic acceptance by the courts. The Office of Technology Assessment, an advisory body to the US Congress, reviewed the scientific and legal status of DNA typing in 1990.7 The National Research Council (NRC), the policy arm of the National Academy of Sciences and the nation's most respected source of science advice, studied the technique in 1992; when some of its recommendations were challenged, the NRC convened a second committee to produce a more authoritative follow-up report.8 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched an immense effort to standardize the procedures for collecting and analyzing DNA samples from crime scenes. Meanwhile, as several papers in this Special Issue show, a rapidly expanding array of private DNA-testing companies hastened to develop reliable systems of peer review and proficiency testing.9 In 1994, the Federal Judicial Center attempted to systematize the response of judges to this still novel technique: one section of the FJC's reference manual on scientific evidence instructed the judiciary how to ask meaningful questions about DNA typing. 1
Despite these energetic efforts, closure proved elusive. Both prosecution and defense lawyers in the Simpson case, for example, recognized the still-fluid character of DNA evidence, and rushed to line up allies for their particular interpretations."1 Charismatic trial lawyers and law professors, well-established DNA-testing firms, staid professionals from state crime laboratories, and even a flamboyant Nobel Laureate scientist,12 formed a star-studded instructional team for 'the most detailed course in molecular genetics ever taught to the US people'.13 The prosecution, along with the majority of white Americans, seemed to accept the DNA evidence as conclusive proof of Simpson's guilt, forgetting in the process that 'blood doesn't talk -people do'.14 The defense brilliantly aimed its attack on people rather than inanimate inscriptions,15 charging the criminalists from the troubled Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) with every kind of deviance, from inconsistency, carelessness and sloppy practice to racially motivated misconduct. By the trial's end, the 'mountain of evidence','6 which prosecutors once had hoped would convict Simpson, had crumbled into an unimpressive, and unpersuasive, molehill.
The causes of this collapse merit careful analysis because its implications reach far beyond the immediate issue of Simpson's guilt or innocence. Was the first Simpson trial, as some have claimed, a truly singular event -unique in its blending of race relations, wealth, sexual jealousy, Hollywood glamour, media attention and the contingencies of local politics7 -from which no general conclusions can be drawn about legal processes or the public understanding of science? Did the prosecution make a simple but fatal blunder in failing to reckon with the American public's fabled 'scientific illiteracy'? Were the lay jurors simply unable to absorb such complex technical data? Alternatively, if comprehension was not the decisive issue, then why did the jury in the criminal trial give so little credence to the testimony of prosecution experts?18 Could the DNAtest results have been represented in ways that would have commanded the jury's trust? And do the answers point toward a wider need for law reform, especially in procedures for presenting and evaluating expert testimony?
To begin addressing these questions, we must situate the first Simpson verdict in terms that are more familiar to science studies, and to social analysis more broadly, than to legal inquiry: that is, as a display of radical disbelief in a story that sought centrally to exploit the authority of science.19 Conventional legal scholarship, with its deep-rooted commitment to the existence of objective facts,20 offers relatively few resources for understanding what makes, or unmakes, the credibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom. Underlying the law's general rules for evaluating expert evidence is a barely concealed sociology of error -or, perhaps more properly, diverse sociologies of error. Evidence ceases to be acceptable in the eyes of the law when it is contaminated by preventable technical or moral failings -for example, a break in the chain of custody, unethical behaviour by a lawyer, dishonesty on the part of an expert witness or reliance on flawed science. The possibility of more radical contingency in the production of evidence lies outside the normal scope of legal analysis and selfawareness.
The dynamics of litigation are partly to blame, since they do much to obscure the complexity of the translations by which samples, artifacts, recordings or pictures become evidence.21 Offering parties have little interest in presenting their technical evidence in a light that could increase the other side's scepticism. It is safer by far to treat evidence as the product of a few simple, black-boxed operations whose integrity can be defended according to the conventions of the legal game. Thus, for physical evidence, the notion of the 'chain of custody' transports the crime scene to the courtroom through a supposedly unbroken series of physical moves. For scientific evidence, the person of the expert witness contains, and in effect conceals, much of the behind-the-scenes work of translation, from the investigative site through the forensic laboratory into testimony at trial. When these simplifying mechanisms function as intended, the microcosms of crime and court are brought into apparently perfect alignment -as parallel universes whose actions mimic one another exactly, albeit at a temporal remove and in different styles and languages. In this way, admissible evidence transforms the events of the world outside into a courtroom re-enactment through a kind of artifice that claims at the same time the power of accurate representation.
For most legal practitioners, language is still the primary medium of translation between reality and its representation in litigation.22 The facts of science are transported into the minds of judges and juries through language, strategically deployed -language codified into rules of admissibility, dramatically configured into opening and closing arguments, professionally packaged as expert testimony, and deconstructed through skilful cross-examination. Yet the courtroom is quintessentially also a theatre in which things are not only related but also shown in order to compel belief.23 Visualization, no less than verbalization, is one of the techniques by which scientific evidence achieves credibility -and so gains, for purposes of legal decisionmaking, the status of fact. Nevertheless, processes for creating, or debunking, visual evidence have received surprisingly little attention in legal analysis, even though verbal testimony is in practice very frequently accompanied by visual supports.
In seeking to manage the interpretive flexibility of facts, the law of evidence has focused first and foremost on various rules and principles, such as the so-called exclusionary rule,24 or the rules of admissibility,25 by which judges can screen the parties' proffered accounts to make sure they are not blatantly flawed or untrue. There is a tacit assumption that evidence which is not defective in these ways provides a more or less accurate mirror of reality. In practice, of course, scientific evidence is a far more complex production that necessarily draws on a wide range of social and cultural resources -such as the persuasive power of inscriptions (in our case, 'DNA fingerprints') in western societies, the authority of professional codes and standards, and judges' and juries' commonsense understandings of science. This incorporation of tacit cultural norms into the manufacture of credible evidence deserves more extensive scholarly attention.26
In this paper, I address the general problem of the authority of science in the courtroom through an examination of what is involved in making DNA evidence convincing to lay fact-finders. DNA typing is particularly interesting in this regard because, unlike much other forensic evidence, it rests on relatively secure theoretical foundations (contrast, for example, the cases of lie detectors and 'clinical ecology'27) and yet it has become highly controversial. The question of vision is crucial to my inquiry. What is it that judges and jurors see when they look at DNA evidence, and what makes their visual experience similar to or different from that of experts? I take it as axiomatic that neither belief nor disbelief in the reliability of DNA evidence should be privileged in probing the reasons for divergent assessments of its credibility.28 I also follow recent trends in the study of visual representations in assuming no preordained hierarchical relationship between expert and lay perceptions of scientific images and inscriptions: what interests me instead is how each viewpoint may be constitutive of the other.29 Drawing on transcripts and opinions from US legal cases involving DNA testimony, I suggest that seeing is an essential precondition for believing, but that the right to see is itself in dispute when science comes under legal scrutiny. To establish a privileged point of view with respect to scientific facts, conflicts must be resolved between divergent visual representations of the evidence, between direct and 'virtual' witnessing,30 and between lay and professional vision.31 Who resolves such disputes and by what rules, emerge therefore as substantial questions for the legal process.
Bloodstains and Signature Prints
In a pre-technological era, blood, it was thought, spoke directly to people, telling with unambiguous signs, sometimes even in plain speech, of deeds of infamy. Reminders of that simple belief survive in our cultural heritage, preserved in the resin of literary creativity. Lady Macbeth still walks the stage trying to wash the imagined blood of murdered Duncan from her hands, bloodstains so stubborn that one touch of them will change the colour of the sea, 'making the green one red'. The anxious mother in the Grimms' folktale, The Goose Girl, gives to her daughter at parting a white handkerchief into which she has let fall three drops of blood from her own finger. When the poor girl is forced by her wicked maid to dismount from her horse and drink from a stream, the drops of blood call out to her: 'If this your mother knew, her heart would break in two'. In the Rajput legend of Siladitya, the hero's young queen is embroidering a turban of the finest silk for her husband to wear on his return from war. She pricks her finger and a drop of blood falls on the precious work. When she tries to wash it off, the drop spreads through the entire fabric, red stain on green silk, warning her that the husband she loves is dead.
But ours is an age of scientific enchantment. Blood, along with other bodily fluids and tissues, still speaks with authority, but only through the miraculous translations wrought by science and technology. DNA typing is one such miracle, and its unprecedented power to establish the truth is reiterated almost as a refrain whenever people have occasion to talk about its use in law enforcement. Mr Justice Orton, the British trial judge in Regina v. Pitchfork, the first murder case to use DNA evidence, introduced the theme of inevitability that soon became part of the technique's mystique: 'The rapes and murders were of a particularly sadistic kind. But while displays of evidence within scientific communities may typically conform to mutually understood rules of representation (both graphic and linguistic),38 lawyers and their expert witnesses perform before audiences who have not been trained to see reality in similar ways. As a result, the presentation of scientific evidence, and the training of the judge or jury to see it as scientists themselves do, proceed simultaneously in legal settings. Human eyesight, however, is not so easily disciplined to see the 'same thing' in the same way, even when the spectacle is directly accessible to the naked eye.39 Scientific inscriptions, moreover, pose distinctive problems for non-specialist vision. They are highly mediated artifacts, often seen only with the aid of instruments (telescopes, gravity-wave detectors, electron microscopes, modelling software and, in DNA analysis, electrically charged gels) that confer a monopoly of vision on those who know how to use them.40 It takes skill and resources to master the relevant instrumentation, and yet more resources to extend the monopoly so gained outward from the locus of scientific activity -the field study, clinical trial or lab group -to wider communities of 'virtual witnesses'. Yet, as Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer have elegantly argued,4' precisely such extension beyond an immediate circle of observers is needed to transform scientific claims into matters of fact. And the distant, peripheral witnesses retain, in principle, the right to rebel against the metropoles of science, its 'centres of calculation',42 by reasserting their own undisciplined and individualized vision.
In legal contests over scientific evidence, the superiority of the expert's trained and mediated vision over the lay fact-finder's unmediated witnessing needs to be formally established; it can never be taken for granted. Sometimes, an image or inscription presented in court is so direct and 
Framing Vision, Constructing Expertise
Scientific testimony presents particular challenges for adjudication because courts are reluctant to assert with respect to scientific fact-finding the same unconstrained sovereignty that they assume with respect to all other kinds of facts. The legal community has long taken for granted that the demarcation between reliable and unreliable scientific viewpoints is established in important part outside the purview of the law and can be unproblematically imported into legal proceedings. This assumption underlies the calls by conservative law reformers to eliminate 'junk science' (the unreliable offerings of untrustworthy experts) from the courtroom and to replace it with 'mainstream science'.53 Rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence also assume that the demarcation between genuine and spurious expertise is already there for judges to find. Judges are seen as 'gatekeepers', because they have the power to let in the reliable testimony and shut the gate against mere pretence. Thus the 1923 federal appeals court decision in Frye v. United States announced the 'general acceptance' test of admissibility.54 The ruling instructed judges to discover, in effect, which scientific views were generally accepted and which were not; evidence that failed the acceptability test was not admissible.
Of course, the so-called Frye rule proved easier to conceptualize than to apply in practice. Courts soon found themselves in disarray, disagreeing on how many experts were needed for general acceptance, and whether novel offers of scientific and technical proof, such as radar detection devices to establish speeding violations, voice-prints to prove a speaker's identity, or the statistical analysis of literary style (stylometry) to establish authorship, were generally accepted.55 Legal commentators attributed the disconcertingly divergent results to judicial 'inconsistency', and asked for clearer rules to enable judges to discern more reliably just where authentic claims shade off into the grey zone of unacceptability. The 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was the answer offered by the nation's highest court.56 Daubert replaced Frye with the injunction that evidence should be scientifically reliable and relevant in order to be admitted. Reliability, the Court further opined, should be decided according to criteria used by scientists themselves. For starters, the Court offered four non-exclusive criteria: does the evidence rest on a tested and falsifiable theory or technique; has the underlying science been peer-reviewed; what is the technique's error rate; and is it generally accepted?57
By looking to externally certified demarcation criteria, the Frye-Daubert approach chose to overlook the court's own contingent and case-specific r6le in establishing the preconditions of credibility. Judges, as I have suggested in earlier writing,58 do not so much find as actively participate in creating the dividing lines between appropriate and inappropriate offers of expertise. They do so by selectively privileging some expert viewpoints over others, by creating new hierarchies as needed among classes of potentially credible experts (thus, 'scientists' may be more highly ranked than 'technicians', 'treating physicians' than epidemiologists, epidemiologists than toxicologists, and so on). At the limits, they may exclude some experts altogether, or appoint their own experts to provide more neutral scientific accounts than those presented by the parties' experts.
Less blatantly, though no less influentially, judges also import into demarcation decisions their own submerged understandings of the methods of science. Lay perceptions of how science works constitute in this way the template against which courts measure the acceptability of expertise. For illustration, let us turn to a California drunk-driving trial involving a police practice known as 'horizontal gaze nystagmus' -a 'field test' in which inspection of the suspect's eyeball movements (a most literal form of 'eyeballing') provides an index of drunkenness or sobriety. The California judge excluded the evidence, ruling that the administering police officer could not be credited either as a lay witness (his vision was too experienced for that designation) or as an expert (his vision was not properly disciplined by the scientific method).59 To count as expert, the court indicated, the officer's vision should have been mediated by recognized scientific practices, such as instrumentation or quantification. We return again to the issue of authoritative vision. At the heart of the US legal system's often agonized inquiries into the admissibility of expert knowledge is still the recurring question: 'Whose sight can we trust, if not our own?'.
In a perceptive analysis of the infamous Rodney King case, the anthropologist Charles Goodwin observes that visual evidence acquires special power when it is certified as 'professional vision'. Raw observation, he suggests, is often meaningless unless it can be disciplined into particular 'socially organized ways of seeing and understanding events that are answerable to the distinctive interests of a particular social group'. 60 Goodwin calls attention to three discursive practices -coding, highlighting, and producing and articulating material representations -that lawyers and expert witnesses use to impose meaning on a jumbled mass of visual impressions. In the trial of King's assailants, a murky videotape of the beating was translated into two conflicting narratives, an uncoded lay version and a coded professional version offered by Sergeant Charles Duke, a member of the LAPD but also an expert on police practice. In the victim's (lay) rendition, the tape displayed a single, continuous action, depicting a helpless, unresisting African-American man being viciously beaten by a gang of white attackers. In Duke's (professional) version, the scene was analytically fragmented into a sequence of disjointed minievents, in which the jerky movements of the victim's separate body parts offered to trained police officers the rationale for new 'assessment periods', 'escalations of force' and strategically directed 'kicks' and 'blows'.61 Goodwin concludes, following Foucault,62 that the power to engage in professional speech, and so to constrain the fact-finder's vision, is unevenly distributed across society. This imbalance makes it extremely difficult for those lacking the resource of professionalism to represent their points of view as rational, credible or true. Shapiro: After reviewing the protocol which Ms Clark said we had, which we did not have until yesterday by fax, it's clear that the procedures outlined by the laboratory that the prosecution has chosen serve no purpose whatsoever. For us to have experts there witnessing some parts of their procedure serves no purpose whatsoever. I talked to Dr Lee [a respected expert from the Connecticut state crime lab] at length yesterday on this issue, and he said it just would be an exercise in futility to merely stand there, under these guidelines, and observe what they are doing regarding testing procedures, so we would respectfully again ask the court to revisit the issue of giving us a 50% sample so we can do our own independent testing. Short of that, to give us some access to watch under some defined terms is something that will be of no probative value whatsoever.64
Convincing as Goodwin is in deconstructing the expert testimony on
One is instantly struck by the predictable, even instinctive use of lawyer's tricks in this richly textured passage: the implicit accusation of bad faith in the late delivery of the fax, and the impugning of Cellmark's independence by calling it 'the laboratory that the prosecution has chosen'. But behind Shapiro's adversarial gibes was a more serious, global objective -the desire to wrest control of scientific fact-making from the prosecution and its designated experts. To do this, he had to deny the power of mere observation to validate the integrity of somebody else's professional practice (simply watching, he said, 'will be of no probative value whatsoever'). Seeing, he implied, must be indissolubly linked to doing, in a seamless, inviolable, self-contained world of technical practice, in order to guarantee the credibility of the inscriptions it produces. So much for Robert Boyle and the force of 'virtual witnessing': here, immanent in prosaic, 20th-century law talk, was Hobbesian scepticism triumphant. 65 The judgement that Clark and Shapiro called upon Ito to make was not therefore the classic Solomonic one of deciding how to divide drops of blood too small for conventional laboratory diagnosis between two contending parties. More than each side's proprietary rights to the samples was at stake here (although ownership was an issue that Shapiro explicitly raised). In deciding whether to give the prosecution complete control over the samples or to surrender '50%' to the defense, Ito was confronted in effect with opposing philosophies of credibility, founded on different understandings of the connections between doing, seeing and believing. A superficially childish 'custody dispute' over blood samples drew the judge into evaluating the professional lifeworld of DNA typing, as constructed by a private testing company and sanctioned by a police department. By choosing to approve Marcia Clark's theory of witnessing, Ito helped to reinforce the boundary that Cellmark wished to draw between its own world of expert practice and the watching world outside.
Lies and Videotape
Rulings that would eventually have an impact on the credibility of DNA evidence did not necessarily concern the manipulation of blood samples to start with. A notable example of such a collateral judgment was Ito's decision to admit a videotape of police activity at the crime scene over the prosecution's strenuous objections. In seeking to exclude the tape, Marcia Clark advanced on behalf of the prosecution an argument similar to Goodwin's claim that 'all vision is perspectival and lodged within endogenous communities of practice'.66 Three extracts from an admissibility hearing held on 23 February 1995 show Clark trying in vain to establish the need for professional interpretation to make sense of the camera's testimony: Clark (1): As the Court can see, at the very point so far when the defense would ask the jury to make an inference, the very point that they're trying to make is obscured. This epitomizes the problem with this whole tape. It looks from this that everyone is standing on top of each other with not two inches between them. We know that is not the case. That obviously can't physically be the case. But it's such a misleading and distorted clip that you can't tell where everyone is standing. Clark (2): This is a piece of evidence that is not evidence. This is a distortion, this is a method of confusion, and it does not inform the jury of anything of probative value. In fact, quite contrary. It obscures the fact that it purports to -that the defense says it purports to show. Plain, unmediated eye-witnessing of the videotape, Clark exhorted the court, would not allow the jury to see without distortion what in fact had happened. The tape was the product of a specialized technical practicephotography -with its own internal mysteries of skill and interpretation. It was an encoding of reality rather than a mere reflection of it, and, without an expert decoder such as a cameraman to help them, the jurors would not be able to decode it properly. They would be misled into thinking, for instance, that the LAPD investigators (including, as it happens, the criminalist Denis Fung who was later to be cross-examined by Barry Scheck) were standing on top of each other, when they had actually maintained a proper distance. As in the Rodney King case, the prosecution claimed that the naked eye was not to be trusted with a video. Unless the tape could be seen through the filter of expert interpretation, it was 'a piece of evidence that is not evidence'. Ito was persuaded. Although he claimed to be fascinated by the prosecution's arguments, he ruled in favour of the defense: the videotape, he concluded, was ostensibly 'as accurate a depiction as we will ever get. It is not someone's recollection or interpretation. It's the events as they unfolded'. As if convincing himself of the rightness of this judgment, Ito went on to describe aloud all the comings and goings that he could discern on the tape, without any need for an expert to decode it: And the court is able to discern from looking at the videotape itself that this videotape was taken at a relevant point when the coroner's investigator, Ms Radcliffe, arrives, she appears to be briefed by Detective Lange. We and looking back upon 'the events as they unfolded' through the transparent, and for him truthful, window of the videotape. Yet, not until Ito finished his public-private deliberation was it clear that, for purposes of this trial, the videotape would count as a form of direct, not technically or professionally mediated, seeing, so that the jury, like the judge, could view the tape without the aid of intervening experts.
Against this attempt to recast the video as a kind of professionally mediated vision, Johnny

Standardizing Vision
DNA evidence was excluded in a number of trials before Simpson's because the inscriptions were produced in accordance with methods that were shown to be ad hoc, non-standard and therefore unscientific in the eyes of experts as well as laypersons. What the experts saw and how they claimed to see it were the central issues, and differences among testing laboratories served to undermine particular expert positions. Work in science studies has dwelt in some detail on this aspect of legal controversies, showing how adversarial processes deconstruct credibility by bringing to light myriad tacit and untested assumptions about physical and social reality that enter into the production of science. 70 In Maine v. McLeod, a sexual molestation case, the defense questioned the way in which scientists at Lifecodes, a DNA-testing firm, had identified a match between two samples. The two 'fingerprints' in this case were not identical to the untrained eye: although the pattern looked the same, the bands in one print were displaced relative to the other, suggesting that the DNA fragments in the two samples were of different lengths. The Lifecodes experts had used a mathematical formula to correct for the observed bandshift; this adjustment allowed the lab to find sameness where lay observation might have been inclined to see differences. In this case, the court refused to defer to Lifecodes' visual authority because the adjustment procedure used by the lab had not been reviewed or approved by a wider scientific community. 71 Standardization offered to testing laboratories and law-enforcement institutions an attractive way out of such quandaries. Standards serve to black-box messy technical practices: behaviour conforming to explicit standards tends to be more resistant to sceptical questioning. Yet, as the Simpson case revealed, standards in the legal context can prove to be a two-edged sword -as much a measure to discredit non-compliant conduct as to protect compliance. Once techniques of visualization are standardized, for example, deviance from the standard can be condemned in normative terms that are equally persuasive to experts and laypeople. For example, Eric Lander, a scientist at MIT's Whitehead Institute who had testified for the defense in Castro, and his co-author, FBI expert Bruce Budowle, characterized the early controversies over lab procedures as follows:
The initial outcry over DNA typing standards concerned laboratory problems: poorly defined rules for declaring a match; experiments without controls; contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy interpretation of autoradiograms. Although there is no evidence that these technical failings resulted in any wrongful convictions, the lack of standards seemed to be a recipe for trouble.72
The language that Lander and Budowle used to debunk the efforts of prior workers in the field is striking in its mundaneness. 73 What Scheck achieved in this and many similar exchanges was not merely to make Fung change his mind or publicly admit error. It was rather to negate the prosecution's science-based strategy for making jurors into virtual witnesses; this he accomplished by questioning Fung's visual authority, and thus breaking the chain of visual custody, as it were, at one of its weakest links. With Fung unable to testify that he saw the stains before Fuhrman had a chance to plant them, no amount of subsequent scientific manipulation could empower the blood evidence from the Bronco to bear witness to the crime.
In everyday litigation, as the material constituents of evidence are converted into scientific facts, their humble origins in the work of individual eyes and hands get lost from view, and with this loss comes a forgetfulness about the shared social and scientific foundations of credibility. Lander and Budowle displayed such a conditioned blindness when they acknowledged the troubled prehistory of forensic DNA typing, but dismissed it none the less, on the ground that 'there is no evidence that these technical failings resulted in any wrongful convictions'.81 Scheck's crossexamination of Fung turned this dismissive assessment on its head by reasserting the primacy of hands-on fieldwork over more theoretically sophisticated expertise; reduced to micro-details, the methods by which the LAPD had attempted to transport the crime scene into the courtroom were shown to be all too fallible. Mundane credibility judgements about Fung's manifold 'technical failings' could then be used with great effect to undermine the prosecution's 'scientific' evidence of Simpson's guilt.
Questions of Process
At the beginning of the criminal trial, Judge Ito's calm demeanour and measured responses to the lawyers' and media's frenetic manoeuvring won wide commendation. He was praised, in particular, for his allegiance to the emerging 'truth school' among scholars of constitutional and criminal law, a nascent intellectual movement determined to cut across the intense ideological polarization of pro-defense and pro-prosecution positions on the admissibility of evidence.82 For adherents of this school, 'DNA' promised to be the perfect ally, an able, almost infallible and (important in America's race-conscious justice system) potentially colour-blind assistant in the programme of truth-finding. But a common-law trial is not purely and simply a search for the truth: it is, more accurately, a contest of credibility between two carefully packaged, competing accounts of the 'same' reality. Plausibility is what carries the day: by trial's end, the winning story is the one that strikes the fact-finder as the more believable.
Assessing Court has also lent powerful support to this move.
Non-party experts possess a number of potential advantages in trumping other claims to privileged witnessing of the facts. Their views come to court bearing an imprimatur of impartiality that tends to boost their credibility. As a 'neutral' third eye in the traditional two-party format of litigation, the court-appointed expert might occupy a quasi-judicial position and would form, together with the party experts, a smaller 'facts' triad (a de facto Science Court) within the larger 'justice' triad comprised by the judge and the legal advocates. These dynamics could well make lay factfinders less assertive in turning their own sceptical gaze on the scientific evidence, thereby reducing conflict, but also foreclosing critical inquiry into the mundane, taken-for-granted aspects of scientific practice and the normative presuppositions of experts.
Excluding Experts
Rules governing the admissibility of evidence provide another powerful method of enhancing judicial control over the parties' offers of expert testimony. Daubert and Joiner attest to the federal judiciary's growing frustration with the contributions of partisan experts. These cases assume that legitimate expertise is constituted outside the processes of the law and can be identified by proper application of relevant demarcation criteria. As we have seen, however, expertise in the legal context is -to paraphrase Bruno Latour 87 and Richard Rorty 88 -more the consequence than the cause of demarcation. In designating some witnesses as legitimate experts, and in distinguishing among different forms of witnessing, judges inevitably impose on fact-finding their own understandings about whose vision of the world counts as authoritative (or genuinely 'scientific') and whose does not. In so doing, they limit the range of interpretive flexibility available to lay questioning.
The The judge's eye, then, is the eye of power. Its authoritative position may need to be accepted in the interests of social repose -but it need not be accepted uncritically. In conflicts over whose perception of the truth or the facts should take precedence, the inevitable plurality of vision that litigation generates must be disciplined in somebody's favour, consistently with wider notions of efficiency, fairness and justice. The innumerable, contingent disputes that any trial opens up between different ways of seeing require someone to turn to as the witness of last resort. This, in western legal systems, is one of the essential functions of judging.
What a democratic society should wish to cultivate, however, is an informed exercise of judicial power, deeply cognizant of its own role in constructing expertise rather than unthinkingly ratifying others' ill-or wellfounded claims to privileged sight. In an age of heightened sensitivity to difference, and the far from self-evident nature of many truths, we may reasonably ask for judges learned in the subterranean social dynamics of credibility, knowledge and expertise. If the way judges see the world shapes how others in the courtroom must see it, then judicial vision should be trained to acknowledge and criticize its own power to constrain social perceptions of the truth. Justice can no longer afford to be blind. 
